We focus on the problem of adding fault-tolerance to an existing concurrent protocol in the presence of unchangeable environment actions. Such unchangeable actions occur in cases where a subset of components/processes cannot be modified since they represent third-party components or are constrained by physical laws. These actions differ from faults in that they are (1) simultaneously collaborative and disruptive, (2) essential for satisfying the specification, and (3) possibly non-terminating. Hence, if these actions are modeled as faults while adding fault-tolerance, it causes existing algorithms to declare failure to add fault-tolerance.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we focus on the problem of model repair for the purpose of making the model stabilizing or faulttolerant. Model repair is the problem of revising an existing model/program so that it satisfies new properties while preserving existing properties. It is desirable in several contexts Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. such as when an existing program needs to be deployed in a new setting or to repair bugs. Model repair for faulttolerance enables one to separate the fault-tolerance and functionality so that the designer can focus on the functionality of the program and utilize automated techniques for adding fault-tolerance. It can also be used to add faulttolerance to a newly discovered fault.
This paper focuses on performing such repair when some actions cannot be removed from the model. We refer to such transitions as unchangeable environment actions. There are several possible reasons that actions can be unchangeable. Examples include scenarios where the system consists of several components -some of which are developed in house and can be repaired and some of which are third-party and cannot be changed. They are also useful in systems such as Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) where modifying physical components may be very expensive or even impossible.
The environment actions differ from fault actions considered in [5] . Fault actions are assumed to be temporary in nature, and all the previously proposed algorithms to add fault-tolerance in [5] , work only with this important assumption that faults finally stop occurring. However, unlike fault actions, environment actions can keep occurring. Environment actions also differ from adversary actions considered in [4] or in the context of security intrusions. In particular, the adversary intends to cause harm to the system. By contrast, environment actions can be collaborative as well. In other words, the environment actions are simultaneously collaborative and disruptive. The goal of this work is to identify whether it is possible for the program to be repaired so that it can utilize the assistance provided by them while overcoming their disruption. To give an intuition of the role of the environment and the difference between program, environment, and fault actions, next, we present the following example.
An intuitive example to illustrate the role of environment. This intuitive example is motivated by a simple pressure cooker (see Figure 1 ). The environment (heat source) causes the pressure to increase. In the subsequent discussion, we analyze this pressure cooker when the heat source is always on. There are two mechanisms to decrease the pressure, a vent and an overpressure valve. For sake of presentation, assume that pressure is below 4 in normal states. If the pressure increases to 4 or 5, the vent mechanism reduces the pressure by 1 in each step. However, the vent may fail (e.g., if something gets stuck at the vent pipe), and its pressure reduction mechanism becomes disabled. If the pressure reaches 6, the overpressure valve mechanism causes the valve to open resulting in an immediate drop in pressure to be less than 4. We denote the state where pressure is a by sa when the vent is working, and by state f sa when the vent has failed.
Our goal in the subsequent discussion is to model the pressure cooker as a program and identify an approach for the role of the environment and its interaction with the program so that we can conclude this requirement: starting from any state identified above, the system reaches a state where the pressure is less than 4.
Next, we argue that the role of the environment differs from that of fault actions and program actions. In turn, this prevents us from using existing approaches such as [5] . Specifically,
• Treating the environment as a fault does not work.
Faults are assumed to be exceptional events in the system that are expected to stop after some time. In contrast, heat is an essential part of the system that is needed for the system to work. In addition, if we treat the environment as a fault, then none of the environment transitions including transitions from state f s4 to f s5 and from f s5 to f s6 are required to occur. If these actions do not occur, the overpressure valve is never be activated. Hence, neither the valve nor the vent mechanism reduces the pressure to be less than 4.
• Treating the environment transitions similar to program transitions is also not acceptable. To illustrate this, consider the case where we want to make changes to the program in Figure 1 . For instance, if the overpressure valve is removed, then this would correspond to removing transition from s6 (respectively f s6) to where pressure is less than 4. Also, if we add another safety mechanism, it would correspond to adding new transitions. However, we cannot do the same with environment actions that capture the changes made by the heat source. For example, we cannot add new transitions (e.g., from f s4 to s4) to the environment, and we cannot remove transitions (e.g., from s4 to s5). In other words, even if we make any changes to the model in Figure 1 by adding or removing safety mechanisms, the transitions marked environment actions remain unchanged. We cannot introduce new environment transitions and we cannot remove existing environment transitions. This is what we mean by environment being unchangeable.
• Treating the environment to be collaborative without some special fairness to the program does not work either. In particular, without some special fairness for the program, the system can cycle through states s4, s5, s4, s5 · · · .
• Treating the environment to be simultaneously collaborative as well as adversarial where the program has some special fairness enables one to ensure that this program achieves its desired goals. In particular, we need the environment to be collaborative, i.e., if it reaches a state where only environment actions can execute then one of them does execute. (Note that this requirement cannot be expected of faults.) This is necessary to ensure that system can transition from state f s4 to f s5 and from f s5 to f s6 which is essential for recovery to a state where pressure is less than 4.
We also need the program to have special fairness to require that it executes faster than the environment so that it does not execute in a cycle through states s4, s5, s4, · · · . (We will precisely define the notion of faster in Section 2.1.)
Goal of the paper. Based on the above example, our goal in this paper is to evaluate how such simultaneously collaborative and adversarial environment can be used in adding stabilization and fault-tolerance to a given program.
We also note that the results in [5] do not model environment actions. Using the framework in [5] for the above example would require one to treat the environment actions to be fault actions. And, as discussed above, this leads to an unacceptable result.
Contributions of the paper.
The main results of this work are as follows:
• We present an algorithms for addition of stabilization to an existing program. This algorithm is designed for the case where the program is provided with minimal fairness (where the program is given a chance to execute at least once between any two environment actions). This algorithm is sound and complete, i.e., the program found by it is guaranteed to be stabilizing and if it declares failure then it implies that adding stabilization to that program is impossible.
• We present an algorithm for addition of fault-tolerance. In this paper, we focus on failsafe fault-tolerance. This algorithm is also sound and complete.
• We show that the complexity of all algorithms presented in this paper is polynomial (in the state space of the program).
• We have extended the algorithm for adding stabilization to deal with the case where the program is provided additional fairness. This algorithm is especially applicable when adding stabilization with minimal fairness is impossible. We have also developed an algorithm for addition of masking fault-tolerance. Due to the reason of space, we refer the reader to [20] for these algorithms.
Organization of the paper. This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we provide the definitions of a program design, specifications, faults, fault-tolerance, and safe stabilization. In Section 3 we define the problem of adding safe stabilization, and propose an algorithms to solve that problem for the case of minimal fairness. In Section 4, as a case study, we illustrate how adding stabilization algorithm can be used for the controller of a smart grid. In Section 5, we define the problem of adding fault-tolerance, and propose the algorithm to add failsafe fault-tolerance. In Section 6 we show how our proposed algorithms can be extended to solve related problems. In Section 7, we discuss related work. In section 8, we discuss application of our algorithms for cyber-physical and distributed systems. Finally, we make concluding remarks in Section 9
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we define the notion of programs, specification, faults, and fault-tolerance. We define programs in terms of their states and transitions. The definitions of specification is based on that by Alpern and Schneider [1] . And, the definitions of faults and fault-tolerance are adapted from those by Arora and Gouda [2] . The environment in which the program executes also changes the state of the program. Instead of modeling this in terms of concepts such as variables that are written by program and variables that are written by the environment, we use a more general approach where models it as a subset of Sp × Sp. Thus, Definition 2 (Environment). An environment δe for program p, is defined as a subset of Sp × Sp.
Program Design Model

Definition 3 (State Predicate).
A state predicate of p is any subset of Sp.
Definition 4 (Projection).
The projection of program p on state predicate S, denoted as p|S, is the program Sp, {(s0, s1) : (s0, s1) ∈ δp ∧ s0, s1 ∈ S} . In other words, p|S consists of transitions of p that start in S and end in S. We denote the set of transitions of p|S by δp|S.
We assume that from any state in the state space of a program p in an environment δe, there is at least one transition in δp ∪δe. If there is no transition from state s0 in δp ∪δe, we add the self-loop transition (s0, s0) to δp. We note that this assumption is not restrictive. Instead, it is made to simplify subsequent definitions, since we do not need to concern with terminating computations separately.
. Let p be a program with state space Sp and transitions δp. Let δe be an environment for program p and k be an integer greater than 1. We say that a sequence s0, s1, s2, ... is a p[] k δe computation iff • ∀i : i ≥ 0 : si ∈ Sp, and • ∀i : i ≥ 0 : (si, si+1) ∈ δp ∪ δe, and
Note that the above definition requires that in every step, either a program transition or an environment transition is executed. Moreover, after the environment transition executes, the program is given a chance to execute in the next k−1 steps. However, in any state that no program transition is available, an environment transition can execute.
Definition 6 (Closure).
A state predicate S is closed in a set of transitions δ iff (∀(s0, s1) : (s0, s1) ∈ δ : (s0 ∈ S ⇒ s1 ∈ S)).
Specification
Following Alpern and Schneider [1] , we let the specification of program to consist of a safety specification and a liveness specification.
Definition 7 (Safety).
The safety specification is specified in terms of a set of transitions, δ b , that the program is not allowed to execute. Thus, a sequence σ = s0, s1, . . . refines the safety specification δ b iff ∀j : 0 < j < length(σ) :
Definition 8 (Liveness). The liveness specification is specified in terms of a leads-to property (L ; T ) to denote, where both L and T are state predicates. Thus, a sequence σ = s0, s1, . . . refines the liveness specification iff ∀j : L is true in sj : (∃k : j ≤ k < length(σ) : T is true in s k ).
Definition 9 (Specification).
A specification, is a tuple Sf, Lv , where Sf is a safety specification and Lv is a liveness specification. A sequence σ refines spec iff it refines Sf and Lv.
Definition 10 (Refines). p[] k δe refines spec from S iff the following conditions hold:
• S is closed in δp ∪ δe, and • Every computation of p[] k δe that starts from a state in S refines spec.
We note that from the above definition, it follows that starting from a state in S, execution of either a program action or an environment action results in a state in S. Transitions that start from a state in S and reach a state outside S will be modeled as faults (cf. Definition 12).
Definition 11 (Invariant).
If p refines spec from S and S = φ, we say that S is an invariant of p for spec.
Faults and Fault-Tolerance
Definition 12 (Faults). A class of faults f for p(= Sp, δp ) is a subset of Sp × Sp.
. Let p be a program with state space Sp and transitions δp. Let δe be an environment for program p, k be an integer greater than 1, and f be the set of faults for program p. We say that a sequence s0, s1, s2, ...
A failsafe fault-tolerant program ensures that safety property is not violated even if faults occur. In other words, we have Definition 14 (failsafe fault-tolerance). p[] k δe is failsafe f -tolerant to spec (= Sf, Lv ) from S iff the following two conditions hold:
We also define the notion of stabilizing programs. We extend the definition from [11] and [12] by requiring a stabilizing program to satisfy certain safety property during recovery. We consider this generalized notion because it allows us to capture program restrictions, such as inability to change environment variables. The traditional definition of stabilization is obtained by setting δ b in the following definition to be the empty set.
Definition 15 (Safe Stabilization). p[] k δe is δ b -safe stabilizing for invariant S iff following conditions hold:
• S is closed in δp ∪ δe, and 
ADDITION OF SAFE STABILIZATION
In this section, we present our algorithm for adding safe stabilization to an existing program. In Section 3.1, we identify the problem statement. In Section 3.2, we present our algorithm for the case where the parameter k (that identifies the fairness between program and environment actions) is set to 2. Due to reasons of space, the algorithm for arbitrary value of k is presented in [20] .
Problem Definition
The problem for adding safe stabilization begins with a program p, its invariant S, and a safety specification δ b that identifies the set of bad transitions. The goal is to add stabilization so that starting from an arbitrary state, the program recovers to S. Moreover, we want to ensure that during recovery the program does not execute any transition in δ b . Also, we want to make sure that the execution of environment actions cannot prevent recovery to S. Thus, the problem statement is as follows:
Given program p with state space Sp and transitions δp, state predicate S, set of bad transitions δ b , environment δe, and k > 1, identify p with state space Sp such that:
Algorithm to Add Safe Stabilization
In this section, we present an algorithm for the problem of addition of stabilization defined in the Section 3.1. The algorithm proposed here adds stabilization for k = 2. When k = 2, the environment transition can execute immediately after any program transition. By contrast, for larger k, the environment transitions may have to wait until the program has executed k − 1 transitions. Observe that if δ b ∩ δe is nonempty then adding stabilization is impossible. This is due to the fact that if the program starts in a state where such a transition can execute then it can immediately violate safety. Hence, this algorithm (but not the algorithms for adding failsafe fault-tolerance) assumes that δ b ∩ δe = φ.
The algorithm for adding stabilization is as shown in Algorithm 1. In this algorithm, δ p is the set of transitions of the final stabilizing program. Inside the invariant, the transitions should be equal to the original program. Therefore, in the first line, we set δ p to δp|S. State predicate R is the set of states such that every computation starting from R has a state in S. Initially (Line 2) R is initialized to S. In each iteration, state predicate Rp is the set of states that can reach a state in R using a safe program transition, i.e., a transition not in δ b . In Line 7 we add such program transitions to δ p .
Algorithm 1 Addition of safe stabilization
Input: Sp, δp, δe, S, and δ b Output: δ p or Not-Possible 1:
for each s0 ∈ Rp do 7:
end for 9:
for each s0 / ∈ R : s2 ∈ ¬(R ∪ Rp) : (s0, s2) ∈ δe ∧ (∃s1 : s1 ∈ (R ∪ Rp) : (s0, s1) ∈ δe ∨ s0 ∈ Rp) do 10: R = R ∪ s0; 11:
end for 12: until (R = R); 13: if ∃s0 / ∈ R then 14:
return Not-Possible; 15: else 16: return δ p ; 17: end if
In the loop on Lines 9-11, we add more states to R. We add s0 to R (Line 10), whenever every computation starting from s0 has a state in S. A state s0 can be added to R only when there is no environment transition starting from s0 and going to state outside R ∪ Rp. In addition to this condition, there should be at least one transition from s0 that reaches R. The loop on Lines 3-12 terminates if no state is added to R in the last iteration. Upon termination of the loop, the algorithm declares failure to add stabilization if there exists a state outside R. Otherwise, it returns δ p as the set of transitions of the stabilizing program.
We use Figure 2 to illustrate Algorithm 1. Figure 2 depicts the status of the state space in a hypothetical i th iteration of loop on Lines 3-12. In this iteration state A is added to R. This is due to the fact that (1) there is at least one transition from A (namely (A, F)) that reaches R and (2) there is no Likewise, state C is also added to R. State B is not added to R due to environment transition (B, E). Likewise, state D is also not added to R. State E is not added to R since there is no transition from E to a state in R.
In the next, i.e., (i + 1) th , iteration, E is added to R since there is a transition (E, A) and A was added to R in the i th iteration. Continuing this, D is added in the (i + 2)
We want to show that Algorithm 1 is sound, i.e., if it finds a solution, the solution satisfies the problem statement for adding stabilization. Based on the notion of fairness for program actions, we introduce the notion of whether an environment transition can be executed in a given computation prefix. Environment action can execute in a computation prefix if an environment action exists in the last state of the prefix and either (1) program cannot execute in the last state of the prefix or (2) the program has already executed k−1 steps. Thus, Definition 16 (environment-enabled). In any prefix σ = s0, s1, . . . , si of p[] k δe, si is an environment-enabled state iff (∃s ::
Lemma 1. Every computation of p [] k δe that starts from a state in R, contains a state in S .
Proof. We prove this by induction. Base case: R = S. The statement is satisfied trivially. Induction step: A state s0 is added to R in two cases :
Since there is no s2 in ¬(R ∪ Rp) such that (s0, s2) ∈ δe, for every (s0, s1) ∈ δe, s1 is in R ∪ Rp. In addition, we know that there is at least one s1 in R ∪ Rp such that (s0, s1) ∈ δe. If s1 is in Rp, there is a program transition from s1 to a state in R. As (s0, s1) ∈ δe, because of fairness assumption, the program can occur, and reach R. Thus, every computation starting from s0 has a state in R (in the previous iteration). Hence, every computation starting from s0 has a state in S.
Case 2 s2 : s2 ∈ ¬(R ∪ Rp) : (s0, s2) ∈ δe ∧ s0 ∈ Rp Since there is no s2 in ¬(R ∪ Rp) such that (s0, s2) ∈ δe, for every (s0, s1) ∈ δe, s1 is either in R or Rp. In addition, we know that there is at least one state s1 in R ∪ Rp such that (s0,
Observation 2. For any s0 such that s0 / ∈ R and ∃s1 :: (s0, s1) ∈ δe, we have ∃s2 : s2 ∈ ¬(R ∪ Rp) : (s0, s2) ∈ δe.
Lemma 2. Let δ p be any program such that δ p ∩ δ b = φ. Let sj be any state in ¬(R ∪ Rp). Then, either sj is a deadlock state in δ p ∪ δe, or for every p [] k δe prefix α = ..., sj−1, sj , there exists suffix β = sj+1, sj+2, . . . , such that αβ is a p [] k δe computation, and one of two conditions below is correct:
Proof. There are two cases for sj:
Case 1 If sj is environment-enabled Based on the Observation 2 there should exist s ∈ ¬(R ∪ Rp) such that (sj, s ) ∈ δe. We set sj+1 = s .
Case 2 If sj is not environment-enabled
In this case (sj, sj+1) ∈ δp, and as sj ∈ ¬(R ∪ Rp), sj+1 ∈ ¬R. (otherwise sj would be in Rp). There are two sub-cases for this case:
Case 2.1 sj+1 ∈ ¬Rp In this case sj+1 ∈ ¬(R ∪ Rp).
Case 2.2 sj+1 ∈ Rp As sj+1 ∈ ¬R ∩ Rp, according to Observation 1, we have ∃s2 : s2 ∈ ¬(R ∪ Rp) : (sj+1, s2) ∈ δe. As (sj, sj+1) ∈ δp, even with fairness (sj+1, s2) can occur. Therefore we set sj+2 = s2, i.e., sj+2 ∈ ¬(R ∪ Rp).
Corollary
Let sj be any state in ¬(R ∪ Rp). Then for every p [] k δe prefix α = ..., sj−1, sj , there exists suffix β = sj+1, sj+2, . . . , such that αβ is a p [] k δe computation, and ∀i : i ≥ j : si ∈ ¬R (i.e. ¬S).
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 is complete. Proof. Algorithm 1 returns Not-possible only when, at the end of loop there exists a state s0 such that s0 / ∈ R. When s0 / ∈ R, according to Observation 1 we have two cases as follows:
Case 1 ∃s2 : s2 ∈ ¬(R ∪ Rp) : (s0, s2) ∈ δe As there exists an environment action to state s2 in ¬(R ∪ Rp), starting from s0 there is a computation that next step is in ¬(R ∪ Rp). Note that, when a computation starts from s0, even with fairness assumption (s0, s2) ∈ δe can occur. Based on Corollary 1, for every δ p such that δ p ∩ δ b = φ, starting from s0, there is a computation such that every state is in ¬R.
∈ Rp Based on Corollary 1, starting from s0 ∈ ¬(R ∪ Rp), there is a computation such that every state is in ¬R. Therefor for every δ p such that δ p ∩ δ b = φ, there is a computation starting from s0 such that all states are outside R (i.e outside s). Thus, it it impossible to have any stabilizing revision for the program. Proof. The proof follows from the fact that each statement in Algorithm 1 is executed in polynomial time and the number of iterations are also polynomial, as in each iteration at least one state is added to R.
CASE STUDY: STABILIZATION OF A SMART GRID
In this section we illustrate how Algorithm 1 is used to add safe stabilization to a controller program of a smart grid. We consider an abstract version of the smart grid described in [16] (see Figure 3) . In this example, the system consists of a generator G and two loads Z1 and Z2. There are three sensors in the system. Sensor G shows the power generated by the generator, and sensors 1 and 2 show the demand of load Z1 and Z2, respectively. The goal is to ensure that proper load shading is used if the load is too high (respectively, generating capacity is too low).
The control center is shown by a dashed circle in Figure 3 . It can read the values of the sensors and turn on/off switches connected to the loads. The program of the control center should control switches in a manner that all the conditions below are satisfied:
1. Both switches should be turned on if the overall sensed load is less than or equal to the generation capacity.
2.
If sensor values reveal that neither load can individually be served by G then both are shed.
3. If only one load can be served then the smaller load is shed assuming the larger load can be served by G.
4. If only one can be served and the larger load exceeds the generation capacity, the smaller load is served. The value of each sensor is an integer in the range [0, max]. And, the status of each switch is a Boolean.
The invariant S for this program includes all the states which are legitimate according to the conditions 1-4 mentioned above. Therefore, S is the union of state predicates I1 to I6 as follows 1 :
Observation 3. For any value of V1, V2, and VG, there exists an assignment to w1 and w2 such that the resulting state is in S.
The environment can change the values of sensors 1 and 2. In addition, environment can keep the current value of a sensor by self-loop environment transitions. However, environment cannot change the status of switches, or leave the invariant. Thus, set of environment transitions, δe is equal to
Ii(s1) }, where v(sj) shows the value of the variable or predicate v in state sj.
Program cannot change the value of any sensor. Thus, set of bad transitions, δ b for this program is equal to {(s0, s1)| VG(s0) = VG(s1) ∨ V1(s0) = V1(s1) ∨ V2(s0) = V2(s1)}.
For the sake of presentation and to illustrate the role of k, we also assume that program cannot change the status of more than one switch in one transition. For this case, we add more transitions to the set of bad transitions. We call the set of bad transitions for this case δ b 2 and it is equal to {(s0, s1)| VG(s0) = VG(s1) ∨ V1(s0) = V1(s1) ∨ V2(s0) = V2(s1) ∨ (w1(s0) = w1(s1) ∧ w2(s0) = w2(s1))}.
Adding Stabilization
Here, we apply Algorithm 1 to add stabilization to program p defined in Section 4.1. We illustrate the result of applying Algorithm 1 for two sets of bad transitions, δ b and δ b 2 .
Adding Stabilization for δ b
At the beginning of Algorithm 1, R is initialized with S. In the first iteration of loop on Lines 3-12, Rp is the set of states outside S that can reach a state in S with only one program transition. A program transition cannot change the value of any sensor.
According to Observation 3, from each state in ¬S it is possible to reach a state in S with changing the status of switches. Therefore, following set of transitions are added to δ p by Line 7:
Ii} Since every state in ¬S (¬R) is in Rp, there does not exist any environment transition starting from any state to a state in ¬(R ∪ Rp). Therefore, all the states in ¬R are added to R by Line 10.
In the second iteration no more states are added to R. Thus, loop on Line 3-12 terminates. Since there is no state in ¬R, the algorithm returns δ p as the transition of the resulting δ b -safe stabilizing program for S.
Adding Stabilization for δ b 2
At the beginning of Algorithm 1, R is initialized with S. In the first iteration of loop on Lines 3-12, Rp is the set of states outside S that can reach a state in S with only one program transition. A program transition cannot change the value of any sensor. In addition, according to δ b 2 , it cannot change the status of both switches. Therefore, state predicate Rp is the union of state predicates Rp 1 to Rp 6 as follows (⊕ denotes the xor operation):
Similarly, ¬(R ∪ Rp) includes every state that is outside S and more than one step is needed to reach a state in S. Therefore, state predicate ¬(R ∪ Rp) is the union of state predicates R p 1 to R p 6 as follows:
Now, observe that for any status of switches, there exists a state in ¬(R ∪ Rp). That means from any state in Sp it is possible to reach a state in ¬(R ∪ Rp) without changing the value of switches using an environment transition. Therefore, no state is added to R in the first iteration, and loop on Lines 3-12 terminates in the first iteration. Since, all the states outside S remains in ¬R, the algorithm declares no solution to the addition problem exists. Therefore, according to the completeness of the Algorithm 1, there does not exist any δ b 2 -safe stabilizing program for the smart grid described in this section when k is equal to 2. This is expected since the only solution for this problem requires changing both sensors simultaneously before the environment is able to disrupt it again. This program does have a solution for k = 3. But we omit its derivation for lack of space.
ADDITION OF FAULT-TOLERANCE
In this section, we present our algorithm for adding failsafe fault-tolerance. In Section 5.1, we identify the problem statement for adding fault-tolerance, and in Section 5.2, we present the algorithm.
Problem Definition
In addition to the set of bad transitions δ b that we used for providing safe stabilization, in this case, we introduce additional parameter δr that identifies additional restrictions on program transitions. As an example, consider the case where a program cannot change the value of sensor, i.e., it can only read it. However, the environment can change the value of the sensor. In this case, transitions that change the value of the sensor are disallowed as program transitions but, they are acceptable as environment transitions. Note that this was not necessary in Section 3 since we could simply add these transitions to δ b , i.e., transitions that violate safety. This is acceptable since addition stabilization requires δ b ∩ δe = φ. However, adding fault-tolerance is possible even if δ b ∩ δe = φ. Hence, we add the parameter δr explicitly. The problem statement for addition of faulttolerance is as follows:
Given p, δe, S, spec, set of program restrictions δr, k > 1, and f such that p[] k δe refines spec from S, and δp ∩ δr = φ, identify p and S such that:
• C1 : every computation of p [] k δe that starts in a state in S is a computation of p[] k δe that starts in S, and
δe is failsafe f -tolerant to spec from S and
The problem statement requires that the program does not introduce new behaviors in the absence of faults (Constraint C1), provides desired fault-tolerance (Constraint C2), and does not include a transition in δr (Constraint C3). Assumption 1. For simplicity of the algorithms and its proof, we assume that there are no deadlocks in δp[]δe in any state in S. In other words, for any s0 in S, there exists a state s1 in S such that (s0, s1) is in δp ∪ δe. If this is not true then we can add self-loops corresponding to those states, i.e., states in {s0|s0 ∈ S ∧ ∀s1 :: (s0, s1) ∈ δp ∪ δe}. Finally, after the fault-tolerant program is obtained, we remove these self-loops. We note that this does not affect either soundness or completeness of any of our algorithms.
Algorithm to Add Fault-Tolerance
The algorithm for adding failsafe fault-tolerance for k = 2 is as shown in Algorithm 2. In this algorithm set ms1 is the set of states no matter how they are reached, starting from them, there exists a computation suffix which violates safety. Set ms2 is the set of states if they are reached by a program or fault transition, starting from them, there exists a computation suffix which violates safety. Note that ms2 always includes ms1. Initially, ms1 is initialized to {s0|(s0, s1) ∈ f ∩δ b }, and ms2 is initialized to ms1∪{s0|∃s1 :: (s0, s1) ∈ δe ∩ δ b } by Lines 1 and 2. Set mt is the set of transitions that the final program cannot have, as they are in δ b ∪ δr, or reach a state in ms2.
In the loop on Lines 4 -10, more states are added to ms1 and ms2. Consequently, mt should be updated. Any state s0 is added to ms1 by Line 7 in two cases: 1) if there exists a fault transition starting from s0 that reaches a state in ms2 2) if there exists an environment transition (s0, s1) such that (s0, s1) is a bad transition or s1 ∈ ms1, and any transition starting from ms1 reaches a state in ms2 (i.e., any transition (s0, s2) ∈ mt).
A state is added to ms2 by Line 8 if it is added to ms1 or if there exists an environment transition to a state in ms1. We update mt by Line 9 to include transitions to new states added to ms2.The loop on Lines 4 -10 terminates if no state is added to ms1 or ms2 in an iteration.
Then, we focus on creating new invariant, S , for the revised program. S cannot include any transition in ms2, as starting from any state in ms2, there is a computation which violates safety. In addition, the set of program transitions of the revised program, δ p , cannot include any transition in mt, as by any transition in mt a state in ms2 is reached. Thus, we initialized δ p with δp|S − mt. Note that S should be closed in p []2δe. In addition, according to Assumption 1, S cannot include any deadlock state. Thus, anytime that we remove a state from S we ensure these condition by calling RemoveDeadlock and EnsureClosure functions.
Note that according to condition C1, of the addition problem defined in the Section 5.1, the set of computations of the revised program inside its invariant should be a subset of set of computations of the original program inside its invariant. Thus, the revised program cannot have any new computation starting from its invariant. In loop on Lines 13 -22 we remove states from S to avoid creating such new computations.
Consider a state s0 starting from which there exists environment transition (s0, s1). In addition there exists program transition (s0, s2) in the set of program transitions of the original program, δp. Set ms3 includes any state like s0. If s0 is reached by environment transition (s3, s0), in the original program according to fairness assumption, (s0, s1) cannot occur. Thus, sequence s3, s0, s1 cannot be in any computation of p[]2δe. However, if we remove program transition (s0, s2) in the revised program, s3, s0, s1 can be in computation of p []2δe. Therefore, we should remove any state like s3 from the invariant. Set ms4 includes any state like s3.
After creating invariant S , we add program transitions 
ms 2 = ms2; 7: ms1 = ms1 ∪ {s0| ∃s1 : s1 ∈ ms2 : (s0, s1) ∈ f } ∪ {s0|(∃s1 :: (s1 ∈ ms1 ∧ (s0, s1) ∈ δe) ∨ (s0, s1) ∈ δe ∩ δ b )) ∧ (∀s2 :: (s0, s2) ∈ mt)}; 8: ms2 = ms2∪ms1∪{s0|∃s1 : s1 ∈ ms1 : (s0, s1) ∈ δe)}; 9: mt = {(s0, s1)| (s0, s1) ∈ (δ b ∪ δr) ∨ s1 ∈ ms2}; 10: until (ms 1 = ms1 ∧ ms 2 = ms2) 11: δ p = δp|S − mt; 12: S = RemoveDeadlock(S − ms2, δ p , δe); 13: repeat 14:
if S = φ then 15:
return Not-Possible; 16:
end if 17: S = S ; 18:
24: return (δ p , S ) ; 25: RemoveDeadlock(S, δp, δe) 26:
repeat 27: S = S; 28: S = S − {s0| (∀s1 : s1 ∈ S : (s0, s1) / ∈ δp)}; 29: S = S − {s0| ∃s1 :: (s0, s1) ∈ δe ∧ s0 ∈ S ∧ s1 / ∈ S}; 30:
until (S = S) 31: return S;
32: EnsureClosure(p, S) 33:
outside it to δ p . Note that outside S , any program transition which is not in mt is allowed to exists in the final program. In Line 15, the algorithm declare the no solution to the addition problem exists, if S is empty. Otherwise, at the end of the algorithm, it returns (δ p , S ) as the solution to the addition problem.
Theorem 4. Algorithm 2 is sound and complete. And, its complexity is polynomial (in the state space of the program).
For reasons of space, we provide the proofs in [20] .
EXTENSIONS OF ALGORITHMS
In this section, we consider problems related to those addressed in Sections 3 and 5. Our first variation focuses on Definition 5. In this definition, we assumed that the environment is fair. Specifically, at least k − 1 actions execute between any two environment actions. We consider variations where (1) this property is satisfied eventually. In other words, for some initial computation, environment actions may prevent the program from executing. However, eventually, fairness is provided to program actions, and (2) program actions are given even reduced fairness. Specifically, we consider the case where several environment actions can execute in a row but program actions execute infinitely often.
Our second variation is related to the invariant of the revised program, S , and the invariant of the original program, S. In the case of adding stabilization, we considered S = S whereas in the case of adding fault-tolerance, we considered S ⊆ S.
Changes to add stabilization and fault-tolerance with eventually fair environment.
No changes are required to Algorithm 1 even if environment is eventually fair. This is due to the fact that this algorithm constructs programs that provide recovery from any state, i.e., it will provide recovery from the state reached after the point when fairness is restored. For Algorithms 2, we should change the input f to include δe∪δ f . The resulting algorithm will ensure that the generated program will allow unfair execution of the program in initial states. However, fault-tolerance will be provided when the fairness is restored.
Changes to add stabilization and fault-tolerance with multiple consecutive environment actions. If environment actions can execute consecutively, we can change input δe to be its transitive closure. In other words, if (s0, s1) and (s1, s2) are transitions in δe, we add (s0, s2) to δe. With this change, the constructed program will provide stabilization or fault-tolerance even if environment transitions can execute consecutively.
Changes to add stabilization and fault-tolerance based on relation between S (invariant of the faulttolerant program) and S (invariant of the fault-intolerant program) No changes are required to Algorithm 1 even if we change the problem statement to allow S ⊆ S without affecting soundness or completeness. Regarding soundness, observe that the program generated by this algorithm ensures S = S. Hence, it trivially satisfies S ⊆ S. Regarding completeness, the intuition is that if it were impossible to recover to states in S then it is impossible to recover to states that are a subset of S. Regarding Algorithms 2, if S is required to be equal to S then they need to be modified as follows: In these algorithms if any state S is removed (due to it being in ms2, deadlocks, etc.) then they should declare failure.
RELATED WORK
This paper focuses on addition of fault-tolerance properties in the presence of unchangeable environment actions. This problem is an instance of model repair where some existing model/program is repaired to add new properties such as safety, liveness, fault-tolerance, etc. Model repair with respect to CTL properties was first considered in [7] , and abstraction techniques for the same are presented in [9] . In [14] , authors focus on the theory of model repair for memoryless LTL properties in a game-theoretic fashion; i.e., a repaired model is obtained by synthesizing a winning strategy for a 2-player game. Previously [3] , authors have considered the problem of model repair for UNITY specifications [8] . These results identify complexity results for adding properties such as invariant properties, leads-to properties etc. Repair of probabilistic algorithms has also been considered in the literature [21] The problem of adding fault-tolerance to an existing program has been discussed in the absence of environment actions. This work includes work on controller synthesis [10, 13, 19] . A tool for automated addition of fault-tolerance to distributed programs is presented in [5] . This work utilizes BDD based techniques to enable synthesis of programs with state space exceeding 10 100 . However, this work does not include the notion of environment actions that cannot be removed. Hence, applying it in contexts where some processes/components cannot be changed will result in unacceptable solutions. At the same time, we anticipate that the BDD-based techniques considered in this work will be especially valuable to improve the performance of algorithms presented in this paper.
The work on game theory [15, 17] has focused on the problem of repair with 2-player game where the actions of the second player are not changed. However, this work does not address the issue of fault-tolerance. Also, the role of the environment in our work is more general than that in [15, 17, 18] . Specifically, in the work on game theory, it is assumed that the players play in an alternating manner. By contrast, we consider more general interaction with the environment.
In [6] , authors have presented an algorithm for adding recovery to component based models. They consider the problem where we cannot add to the interface of a physical component. However, it does not consider the issue of unchangeable actions of them considered in this work.
APPLICATION FOR DISTRIBUTED AND CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
We considered the problem of model repair for systems with unchangeable environment actions. By instantiating these environment actions according to the system under consideration, this work can be used in several contexts. We briefly outline how this work can be used in the context of distributed systems and cyber-physical systems.
One instance of systems with unchangeable actions is distributed programs consisting of several processes. Consider such a collaborative distributed program where some components are developed in house and some are third party components. It is anticipated that we are not allowed to change third party programs during repair. In that case, we can model the actions of those processes as unchangeable environment actions, and use algorithms provided in this paper to add stabilization/fault-tolerance. Our work is directly useful in high atomicity contexts where processes can view the state of all components but can modify only their own. In low atomicity contexts where processes have private memory that cannot be read by others, we need to introduce new restrictions. Specifically, in this context, we need to consider the issue of grouping [5] where adding or removing a transition requires one to add or remove groups of transitions. In particular, if two states s0 and s0 differ only in terms of private variables of another process then including a transition from s0 requires us to add a transition from s0. Extending the algorithms in this context is beyond the scope of this paper.
Another instance in this context is a cyber-physical system. Intuitively, a CPS consists of computational components and physical components. One typical constraint in repairing these systems to satisfy new requirements is that physical components cannot be modified due to complexity, cost, or their reliance on natural laws about physics, chemistry etc. In other words, to repair a CPS model, we may not be allowed to add/remove actions which model physical aspects of the system. Therefore, using the approach proposed here, we can model such physical actions as unchangeable environment actions. After modeling the CPS, we can utilize the algorithms provided in this paper to add stabilization/fault-tolerance automatically, and be sure that the stabilizing/fault-tolerant models found by the algorithms do not require any change to physical components.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we focused on the problem of adding faulttolerance to an existing program which consists of some actions that are unchangeable. These unchangeable actions arise due to interaction with the environment, inability to change parts of the existing program, constraints on physical components in a cyber-physical system, and so on.
We presented algorithms for adding stabilization and failsafe fault-tolerance. These algorithms are sound and complete and run in polynomial time (in the state space). This was unexpected in part because environment actions can play both an collaborative and disruptive role.
We considered the cases where (1) all fault-free behaviors are preserved in the fault-tolerant program, or (2) only a nonempty subset of fault-free behaviors are preserved in the fault-tolerant program. We also considered the cases where (1) environment actions can execute with any frequency for an initial duration and (2) environment actions can execute more frequently than programs. In all these cases, we demonstrated that our algorithm can be extended while preserving soundness and completeness. Finally, as discussed in Section 8, these algorithms are especially useful for repairing CPSs as well as repairing distributed systems where only a subset of processes are repairable.
